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We  show  that  the  standard  trust  question  routinely  used  in  social  capital  research  is 
importantly related to cooperation behavior and we provide evidence on the microfoundation 
of this relation. We run a large scale public goods experiment over the internet in Denmark 
using a design that enables us to disentangle preferences for cooperation from beliefs about 
others’  cooperation.  We  find  that  the  standard  trust  question  is  a  proxy  for  cooperation 
preferences  rather  than  beliefs  about  others’  cooperation.  Moreover,  we  show  that  the 
“fairness question”, a recently proposed alternative to the standard trust question, is also 
related to cooperation behavior but operates through beliefs rather than preferences.  
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1. Introduction 
Trust  has  been  proposed  as  an  important  determinant  of  various  economic  phenomena, 
including  growth  (Knack  and  Keefer  1997,  Zak  and  Knack  2001),  financial  development 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004), civic participation (La Porta et al. 1997), investment 
decisions  and  patterns  of  international  trade  (Guiso,  Sapienza  and  Zingales  2009).  Such 
studies  suggest  that  survey  measures  of  trust  like  the  standard  trust  question  (“Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?”) is a good proxy for “social capital” and that social capital promotes 
economic efficiency by facilitating cooperation and the enforcement of incomplete contracts. 
However, this literature has been challenged on the grounds that it is unclear what survey 
measures such as the trust question actually measure (see e.g. Sobel 2002, Durlauf 2002, 
Beugelsdijk 2006). To address this critique, a growing literature combines survey measures 
and experimental data to shed light on the microfoundations of social capital.  
This paper reports results from a large scale experiment on cooperation in public goods 
games and relates cooperation behavior to survey measures of social capital, in particular the 
standard trust question. The experiment is run over the internet with close to 1500 randomly 
selected participants from the Danish population. We find that both self reported trust and 
observed cooperation levels are high, and regression analysis shows that trust attitudes have a 
significant explanatory power for cooperation behavior. While these results are interesting per 
se, the main focus of this paper is to study the microfoundation of this relation. We argue that 
cooperation choices are driven by preferences and beliefs. Some people have no preference 
for cooperation, and choose to free ride regardless of the contribution level of others (15 
percent in our sample are free riders), but most have a preference for cooperating given that 
others do (69 percent are conditional cooperators).  Beliefs about other peoples’ inclination to 
cooperate do not matter for free riders but do serve as a main determinant of contribution 
levels for conditional cooperators.  
Our main finding is that trust attitudes are a proxy for the strength of people’s cooperation 
preferences but not for beliefs. In particular, we show that responses to the standard trust 
question  (Trust  for  short)  explain  people’s  level  of  contribution  given  their  beliefs  about 
others’  contributions,  but  not  how  optimistic  they  are  about  other  peoples’  tendency  to 
cooperate. We also show that the fairness question (“Do you think most people would try to 
take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?”), an alternative to the 3 
 
trust question that has recently been added to the World Values Survey, is a proxy for beliefs 
but  not  for  preferences.  In  particular,  we  show  that  responses  to  the  fairness  question 
(Fairness for short) explain how optimistic people are, but do not explain the strength of their 
preferences  for  cooperation.  We  speculate  that  the two  survey  measures  capture  different 
aspects of social capital because Trust evokes thoughts about what the respondent generally 
does (“you can’t be too careful”) while Fairness evokes thoughts about how other people 
generally behave (“would they try to be fair?”). The finding that alternative survey measures 
capture  different  aspects  of  social  capital  has  important  implications  for  measurement  of 
social capital and for policy evaluation. For example, cooperation preferences are likely to be 
more stable and more difficult to influence than beliefs about cooperativeness in society.
1 
Thus, to reduce tax evasion, traffic rule violations or bribery, it may be easier to correct 
pessimistic beliefs about other peoples’ compliance with cooperation norms than attempting 
to shape deep preferences for honesty and compliance in the population. 
Our paper contributes in several ways to a recent stream of research combining survey and 
experimental measures of social capital. First, we relate Trust to cooperation behavior while 
the literature has focused almost exclusively on behavior in experimental trust games (notable 
exceptions are Ahn et al. 2003, Gächter, Herrmann and Thöni 2004). This focus on trust 
experiments in the literature is surprising given that “social capital” is a multifaceted concept 
(Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999), and that most definitions of social capital involve notions of 
trust and cooperation. In fact, many contributors to the economics literature see trust and 
cooperation as intimately related concepts (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997, La Porta et al. 1997). 
In  social  psychology,  the  notions  of  trust  and  cooperation  have  long  been  thought  to  be 
closely related. For example, Yamagishi (1986: 111) argues that “mutual trust is the key to 
actual cooperation”. The public goods game used in this study is played in groups and may 
therefore better reflect important aspects of everyday cooperation problems which are often 
multilateral rather than bilateral as in the experimental trust game.
2 
Second, we provide strong evidence that survey measures of social capital are significant 
predictors of cooperation behavior in the Danish population. The literature finds rather mixed 
                                                 
1   Consistent with this view, Naef and Schunk (2010) report that prior experience of untrustworthy behavior 
affects trust in the trust game and that this effect is mainly driven by changes in peoples’ beliefs over 
others’ trustworthiness. When controlling for changes in beliefs, they find only a weak effect of prior 
exposure to untrustworthiness on trust, which indicates that beliefs are likely to be more easily influenced 
than other components of trusting behavior such as preference parameters.
 
2   An additional concern with using trust games is that first mover choices in the trust game may not only 
reflect genuine trust but may also be affected by risk attitudes (Karlan 2005), altruism and reciprocity (Cox 
2004), and betrayal aversion (Bohnet et al. 2008). 4 
 
results  when  relating  survey  and  experimental  measures  of  social  capital.  For  example, 
Glaeser et al. (2000) find that Trust has no predictive power for trust as measured in the trust 
game but it predicts trustworthiness in a sample of students at Harvard University. In contrast, 
Fehr et al. (2003) find a relation of survey measured trust to experimentally measured trust 
but not to trustworthiness in a representative German sample. Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales 
(2007) find that survey trust predicts trust in a sample of MBA students at the University of 
Chicago. Yet, Bellemare and Kröger (2007) do not find a significant relation either to trust or 
trustworthiness in a Dutch sample. When relating survey trust to cooperation behavior, results 
are equally mixed. For example, an early study by Yamagishi (1986) finds that “high trustors” 
contribute more than “low trustors” in a sample of Japanese subjects, while Ahn et al. (2003) 
find no relation between a survey measure of trust and cooperation behavior in a sample of 
US students. Gächter et al. (2004) find that Fairness is related to cooperation behavior in a 
sample from Russia and Belarus. While these studies are difficult to compare due to numerous 
differences in protocol, subject pool and sample size, the mixed results may well be due to 
cultural differences. For example, Holm and Danielsson (2005) find that survey measures of 
trust predict trust in an experiment in Sweden but not, using the same protocol, in Tanzania. 
Third,  our  findings  suggest  that  different  survey  measures  of  social  capital  capture 
different determinants of cooperation and, thus, of social capital. More specifically, we find 
that Trust is related to cooperation preferences but not to beliefs about cooperation, while it is 
the other way around for Fairness. We are able to disentangle these two channels because we 
measure individual choices, beliefs and preferences along with attitudes using two versions of 
the public good game.
3 First, we ran a standard one shot cooperation game which we refer to 
as the Standard game. In this game, participants are endowed with money, approximately $10. 
Participants are anonymously matched into groups of 4 and simultaneously decide how much 
to contribute to a common project. All contributions are doubled and equally shared among 
the 4 participants. Not to contribute is therefore the individually money maximizing choice, 
while  contributing  the  total  amount  is  the  efficient  choice  since  each  dollar  contributed 
increases total group earnings by $2. Participants also indicate their expectation about the 
average contribution of others. In the second game, referred to as the Strategy game below 
(developed  by  Fischbacher,  Gächter  and  Fehr  2001),  participants  provide  a  complete 
                                                 
3   The need to disentangle the causal channels, but also the difficulties in doing so have been recognized by 
many contributors to the literature. For example, Putnam (2001: 137) notes that “The causal arrows among 
civic  involvement,  reciprocity,  honesty,  and  social  trust  are  as  tangled  as  well tossed  spaghetti.  Only 
careful, even experimental, research will be able to sort them apart definitively.” 5 
 
contribution schedule conditional on the contribution choices of others. That is, they decide to 
contribute a, b, c given that others on average contribute x, y, z. Thus, beliefs about the 
average contributions of others do not matter for contributions in the Strategy game by design. 
Other large scale studies have not been able to distinguish between the preference and belief 
channels of cooperation. The closest match to our study in this respect is Sapienza et al. 
(2007).  In  contrast  to  our  results,  these  authors  find  that  Trust  captures  the  belief based 
component but not the preference based component of behavior in trust games.
4 However, our 
finding is broadly in line with Gächter et al. (2004) who show that Fairness is related to 
cooperation behavior, and with Fehr et al. (2003) who find that the trust question remains 
significant for explaining trust behavior even when controlling for beliefs about the money 
sent back by second movers (i.e. beliefs about others’ trustworthiness). 
Our study uses a sample of 1488 subjects, which is unusually large and includes people 
from  all  walks  of  life  in  Denmark.  Laboratory  studies  often  use  convenience  samples  of 
students which tend to be rather homogenous and do therefore not allow the researcher to 
capture heterogeneity in behavior and its relation to socio economics and attitudes.  This is 
possible in large scale studies with heterogenous samples, and our sample is ideally suited for 
this purpose.
5 A potentially important advantage of a large and heterogeneous sample for our 
purposes is that beliefs and actions are less likely to be correlated due to “extrapolation” of 
one’s own behavior to others. Sapienza et al. (2007) argue that this is more likely to happen in 
relatively  homogenous  samples  such  as  groups  of  students  recruited  from  within  a  given 
University. 
The experiment is implemented as an “artefactual field experiment” (Harrison and List 
2004) by running our experiment and survey over the internet rather than in face to face 
interaction (as is the case, for example, in the World Values Survey, Glaeser et al. 2000 or 
Fehr et al. 2003). Using the internet allows participants to make choices and give responses in 
their habitual environment (e.g. at home
6) and the internet could arguably be seen as a more 
                                                 
4   However, the studies are not directly comparable because of differences in experimental protocol (they use 
a  trust  game)  and  subject  pool  (they  use  a  relatively  homogenous  student  sample).  In  addition,  their 
regression analysis does not include Fairness, which makes it hard to compare the results. Comparing the 
results by Sapienza et al. (2007) to our results is also difficult because they use in many specifications a 
measure for unconditional cooperation as a control, which is exactly what Trust measures according to our 
results. 
5   Other large scale studies are, for example, Fehr et al. (2003) with n = 429, Bellemare and Kröger (2007) 
with n = 499, Sapienza et al. (2007) with n = 508, and Gächter et al. (2004) with n = 782 participants.
 
6   Denmark has the highest broadband penetration in the world (source: EU Commission’s Progress report on 
the single European electronic communications market 2007,13th report), and daily usage of the internet, 
e.g. for internet banking, is very common.  6 
 
natural environment for economic experiments, as most people frequently use the internet for 
everyday economic transactions such as e banking and online shopping. Taken together, the 
internet may help reducing the perceived artificiality of the situation while maintaining a high 
level of experimental control. Using the internet also guarantees perfect anonymity between 
subjects. The perfect anonymity and the one shot nature of our experiment are particularly apt 
to capture what is sometimes called “thin” trust (i.e. trust towards a “generalized other” in 
contrast to “thick” trust in repeated interaction within a social network, see e.g. Putnam 2001: 
136.  See  Andreoni  1988  for  the  effects  of  repeated  interaction  between  “partners”  or 
“strangers”). The closest match to our study in this respect is Bellemare and Kröger (2007) 
who use the Dutch Center Panel which is run over computer or TV with a set up box and 
people make choices in the habitual environments. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the relevant parts 
of our experimental design and procedures. Section 3 reports results. We first show that our 
survey measures of social capital are significantly related to socio economic variables such as 
age,  income,  education  and  gender.  Second,  we  relate  Trust  and  Fairness  to  beliefs  and 
behavior  in  the  Standard  game.  We  show  that  contributions  in  the  Standard  game  are 
positively related to beliefs and that both Trust and Fairness explain contributions, controlling 
for socio economics. However, only Trust is found to be directly related to contributions 
while Fairness is indirectly related to contributions through beliefs. Third, in the Strategy 
game, we find that most participants are conditional cooperators, while only few are free 
riders. The incidence and strength of conditional cooperation is explained by Trust to some 
extent but not by Fairness or socio economic variables. Section 4 summarizes and discusses 
our results, including a demonstration that Trust is more stable over time than Fairness in 
recent waves of the World Values survey. This finding supports our interpretation that Trust 
measures relatively stable preferences rather than more fickle beliefs.  
 
2.  Design and Procedures 
The  data  reported  in  this  paper
7 comes  from  two  main  parts.  In  the  experimental  part, 
participants play two public goods games in sequence without feedback. In the survey part, 
                                                 
7   The overall experiment had 6 treatments with random allocation of participants to treatments. This paper 
reports  results  only  from  the  treatment  (Give,  Standard).  Details  about  the  recruitment  procedures, 
participation, and the design of the experiment (including screenshots) can be found at in the supplementary 
online materials which can be downloaded from the authors’ personal homepages. 7 
 
participants respond to two survey questions supposed to measure social capital, and report 
socio economic data.  
The first public goods game (the Standard game) serves to elicit cooperation choices and 
beliefs. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of 4 and endowed with 50 Danish Kroner 
(Dkr.), worth about $10. They could contribute an integer number of Dkr. between 0 and 50 
to a public good. The total amount contributed in a group was doubled and shared equally 
among group members. That is, for each Dkr. a player contributed to the public good he or 
she earned half a Dkr. while the group as a whole earned Dkr. 2, creating a conflict between 
individual  and  collective  rationality.  After  they  had  made  their  contribution  choices,  we 
elicited beliefs about the other group members’ contributions. Participants had to indicate a 
belief about the average contribution of the other three group members. Participants were 
rewarded for belief accuracy using the quadratic scoring rule.
8  
The  second  game  (the  Strategy  game)  served  to  elicit  cooperation  preferences.  The 
Strategy game had the same parameters and payoffs as the Standard game but this time, 
contribution decisions were elicited conditionally on the average contribution of the other 
three subjects in the group (following Fischbacher et al. 2001). More specifically, participants 
received another endowment of Dkr. 50 and they knew that they were randomly re matched to 
new  groups  of  4  participants.  All  subjects  indicated  an  unconditional  contribution  and  a 
conditional contribution. The latter is a complete contribution schedule for all possible levels 
of  average  contributions  by  the  other  3  subjects  rounded  to  multiples  of  Dkr.  5.  Such  a 
conditional contribution strategy consists of 11 contribution decisions, one for each average 
contribution by the other 3 subjects of Dkr. 0, 5, 10,…, or Dkr. 50. A random draw then 
selected one subject in each group to be the conditional contributor. For all other subjects the 
unconditional contribution determined payoffs while the chosen subject contributed according 
to  the  average  of  other  group  members’  unconditional  choices  and  to  her  contribution 
strategy.
9 
                                                 
8   Participants received an additional payment in Dkr. of 10 – 0.004 d
2 ≥ 0, where d is the difference between 
the belief and the true value. 
9   This procedure was common information among the participants. One might worry that cooperation choices 
in the Standard game spill over to the measure of cooperation preferences in the Strategy game such that the 
preference measure is contaminated by actual choices. Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming) show in a 
recent paper that this concern is unwarranted. They find that the Strategy game yields the same measure 
irrespective of whether participants played the Standard game before or after the preference elicitation. 8 
 
In the survey part, subjects responded to two questions measuring attitudes towards trust 
and fairness. To ensure comparability with previous studies, the wording of the questions was 
taken from the Danish version of the World Values Survey.
10 The questions are: 
Trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people?” Possible answers were coded as 1 if the answer was 
“most people can be trusted” and as 0 if the answer was “can’t be too careful”; 
Fairness: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair?” Possible answers range from 1: “would take advantage 
of you” to 10: “would try to be fair”.
11 
Furthermore, subjects took part in an incentivized risk elicitation task and completed the 
cognitive  reflection  test  proposed  by  Frederick  (2005).
12 Finally,  subjects  also  filled  in  a 
questionnaire,  providing,  among  other  items,  information  about  age,  gender,  income  and 
education. 
We recruited subjects in collaboration with Statistics Denmark (the statistics agency of 
Denmark). Statistics Denmark drew a random sample from the Danish population (aged 18 
80) and sent out letters in May 2008 by regular mail, using the official agency letterhead. The 
recipients of the letter were invited to participate in a scientific experiment organized by the 
Center of Experimental Economics (CEE) at the University of Copenhagen in which money 
could be earned. The letter explained that all recipients were randomly selected from the 
Danish population, that the earnings from the experiment will be paid out via electronic bank 
transfer, and that choices are fully anonymous between subjects and between subjects and the 
researchers from CEE. It was possible to maintain anonymity because participants logged into 
the CEE webpage using a personal identification code, the key of which was only known to 
Statistics Denmark.  
                                                 
10   http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
11  Participants also had the option to answer both questions with “don’t know / don’t want to answer”. Only 3 
percent of participants chose not to answer at least one of the questions.  
12   The risk aversion elicitation task was a modified version of the one used in Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen 
(2010). Subjects were presented with a list of 10 choices between two lotteries. Each lottery had two possible 
outcomes and to make it as comprehendible as possible, each outcome had a 0.5 probability of being realized. 
The paired gambles were constructed and presented in such a way that a risk neutral individual would start 
choosing the games presented to the left and then switch to the gambles to the right as they moved down the 
list. The point where the subject switched provides information about his or her risk preferences; a later 
switch point indicates a higher degree of risk aversion. The cognitive reflection test is a short three question 
tested aimed at capturing the individuals’ ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the 
first response that comes in mind. Frederick (2005) shows that the test is predictive of subjects’ behavior in a 
wide range of decision tasks. See the online materials, available at the authors’ homepages, for more 
information.  9 
 
When participants logged into the webpage, they were provided with detailed instructions 
which were carefully designed for easy comprehension. For example, the written instructions 
were supplemented by graphical illustrations of the incentive structure (see figure A1 in the 
appendix).  Before  subjects  made  their  choices,  they  had  to  answer  a  series  of  control 
questions. Throughout the experiment subjects had access to page specific help screens and 
could at any stage go back to review the instructions. Subjects also had access to a profit 
calculator (see figure A2) to explore the relation between the payoffs and the contributions of 
all group members. In addition, participants were offered further assistance via phone or e 
mail.
13  
Participants did not receive feedback about other participants’ decisions until the very end 
of the experiment when they were individually paid out. Counting from the date they received 
the invitation letter, they were given one week to complete the experiment. During that week 
they  could  exit  and  re enter  the  experiment  as  many  times  as  they  wanted.  After  the 
experiment  closed,  subjects  were  matched  into  groups  and  payoffs  were  calculated. 
Thereafter,  participants  could  return  to  the  website  for  feedback  about  the  experimental 
outcome in their respective groups and their earnings. Participants were asked to state their 
bank account number and earnings were paid out via electronic bank transfer. 
 
3.  Results 
Our sample consists of 1488 subjects, and contains all subjects that completed the cooperation 
games and the Trust and Fairness questions. For the regression analysis we also make use of 
an additional set of socio economic control variables which reduces the sample since it was 
voluntary for subjects to provide this information. Our subject pool is highly heterogeneous 
and  captures  a  lot  of  the  underlying  variation  of  the  Danish  population  with  respect  to 
important socio economic variables.
14 All age and educational groups are well represented, 
although the highly educated, the high income earners, and middle aged people are somewhat 
overrepresented.  
For our estimations we use two sets of control variables. A small set contains age and gender. 
Slightly more than half of the 1488 participants are male (51.7 percent) and the age of the 
                                                 
13  The median participant spent about 20 minutes to complete the Standard and the Strategy game, and it took a 
few additional minutes to fill in the questionnaire data used in this paper. 
14  See Table A1 in the appendix for a description of the socio economic characteristics of our sample and a 
comparison with the entire Danish population.  10 
 
participants spans from 18 to 80 years, with an average of 46.4 and a standard deviation of 
14.3  years.
15 A  larger  set  of  controls  contains  information  about  education,  salary,  risk 
aversion and their score in the cognitive reflection test. We asked for participants’ education 
on a four point scale. Participants with basic schooling (up to 10 years of schooling, 8 percent 
of the sample) are our baseline category in the regression analysis below. The categories 
comprised those with degrees from high school and vocational school (25.3 percent, variable 
Education 1), those with tertiary education up to 4 years (47.7 percent, Education 2), and 
those  with  a  longer  tertiary  education  of  at  least  4  years  (16.5  percent,  Education  3). 
Participants are sorted into three groups of about equal size by income. Low income is set 
equal to one for participants in the bottom group, and High income is set to one for those in 
the top income group. For the risk aversion task we used the row at which they switched as an 
indicator of their risk aversion (average switch point 5.14; standard deviation 3.11). Subjects 
that  switched  back  and  forth  are  excluded from  the sample.  We also  included  a variable 
indicating the number of correct answers in the cognitive reflection test (on average subjects 
answered 1.46 out of the three questions correctly; standard deviation 1.11). When including 
the controls of the large set we lose part of the observations, either because the participants 
did not answer the questions or did it inconsistently (the risk task). 
Denmark is placed among the countries with the highest trust level according to the 
World Values Survey. We also find that a large share, 90.1 percent of the respondents, say 
that “most people can be trusted” and the average response to the Fairness question is 7.75 on 
a ten point scale. The two measures are distinct but positively correlated (Spearman's rank 
correlation: ρ = 0.326, p = 0.000).
16  
 
3.1 Relating Trust and Fairness to behavior in the Standard game 
This section shows that beliefs are the main driver of cooperation behavior in the Standard 
game  and  that  both  Trust  and  Fairness  are  positively  related  to  cooperation  behavior. 
However, we show that Fairness is indirectly related to behavior through beliefs, while Trust 
is directly related to cooperation behavior.  
Figure 1: Relation of contribution choices and beliefs in the Standard game 
                                                 
15  One participant indicated an age of ten. 
16   This  is  also  the  case  in  the  World  Values  Survey  data.  In  wave  4  of  the  WVS,  the  Spearman  rank 
correlation test between Trust and Fairness yields: ρ = 0.606; p = 0.000. 11 
 
 
Top panel: Histogram of the beliefs. Right panel: Histogram of the contributions. 
Center panel: Bubble plot showing the relation between beliefs and contributions. 
Bubble size corresponds to the number of observations (n = 1488). 
Figure 1 summarizes the relation between contribution choices and beliefs in the Standard 
game. The right panel of the figure shows a histogram of the contributions. The modal choice 
is full contribution (Dkr. 50), and focal contributions like multiples of Dkr. 5 account for 
almost all contributions. Average contributions are Dkr. 35.0 (70 percent) with a standard 
deviation  of  Dkr.  14.6.  The  top  panel  of  the  figure  shows  a  histogram  of  beliefs  about 
contributions by others. The average belief was Dkr. 31.8 with a standard deviation of Dkr. 
12.0. The bubble plot in the center panel of figure 1 shows that there is a clear positive 
relation  between  contributions  and  beliefs.  This  finding  is  in  line  with  Fischbacher  and 
Gächter (2010) and Dufwenberg, Gächter, Henning Schmidt (2008). However, in contrast to 
these  studies  we  find  that  subjects  tend  to  contribute  more  than  they  believe  others  to 
contribute (note that the mass of observations is above the 45 degree line in figure 1).  
Table 1 provides results for the relation of Trust and Fairness to beliefs and contribution 
choices  in  the  Standard  game.  Columns  (1)  and  (2)  show  the  results  of  OLS  estimates 
explaining beliefs by trust and fairness, using either only age and gender or the larger set of 
control variables.
17 Columns (3) to (6) show how Trust and Fairness relate to contributions. 
                                                 
17   Since the dependent variables Belief and Contribution are censored in [0,50] we also ran Tobit estimations 

























































Columns  (3)  and  (4)  explain  cooperation  choices  excluding  beliefs,  columns  (5)  and  (6) 
including them. 
Columns (1) and (2) show that beliefs are not significantly related to Trust but are strongly 
related  to  Fairness.  Thus,  people  who  expect  others  to  be  fair  also  believe  that  others 
generously contribute to the public good. The coefficient estimate for Fairness in (1) implies 
that subjects who express full confidence in others' fairness hold beliefs that are about Dkr. 
6.1  higher  than  subjects  who  are  certain  that  others  would  take  advantage  of  them.  The 
estimated effect is even stronger when we add the additional controls for income, education, 
risk preferences and the cognitive reflection test score in (2). Here the estimate amounts to 
Dkr.  8.1  between  the  lowest  and  highest Fairness score.  The  demographic  variables  also 
explain some of the variance in beliefs. In particular, we find that female subjects express 
significantly lower beliefs. This effect loses significance once we add the additional controls. 
The effect of age is nonlinear. The coefficient estimates for Age and Age squared show that 
age effects are inverted U shaped, with a maximum at the age around 48 to 52. While the 
effect of Fairness and some of our demographic controls is significant, it should be noted that 
all  variables  taken  together  account  only  for  a  small  portion  of  the  observed  variance  in 
beliefs which is in line with findings from related studies (e.g. Gächter et al. 2004).  
Columns (3) and (4) show that contributions are positively related to Trust and Fairness. 
In particular, column (3) shows that trusting participants contribute about Dkr. 2.7 more than 
non trusting participants. The effect of Trust loses significance when we use the additional 
controls. The effect of Fairness on contributions is of similar order of magnitude as the effect 
on the beliefs. Participants with full confidence in others’ fairness contribute about 16 to 18 
percent (Dkr. 5.8 to 6.5) more than those who think that others will take advantage of the 
situation if they get a chance. The influence of our demographic controls on contributions 
mirrors the estimates for the beliefs. Gender effects are significant as long as we do not add 
the additional controls,
18 and age has an inverted U shaped influence on contributions. That 




                                                 
18   The experimental literature on gender effects in public goods games finds varying results (see Croson and 
Gneezy 2009 for a survey). For example, Gächter et al. (2004) find no effects, Nowell and Tinkler (1994) 
find that all female groups are slightly more cooperative than all male groups. Andreoni and Vesterlund 
(2001) and Solow and Kirkwood (2002) find no unambiguous gender effects. Bellemare and Kröger (2007) 
find that women exhibit significantly higher trust levels than men in their experimental trust games. 
19   Bellemare and Kröger (2007) report similar age effects for their trust games.  13 
 
Table 1: Determinants of Beliefs and Contributions  
 
   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Dependent variable 
   Belief     Contribution 
Trust  0.718   1.594    2.775**  1.845  2.109**  3.332*** 
  (1.114)  (1.576)    (1.359)  (1.911)  (0.883)  (1.221) 
Fairness  0.683***  0.905***    0.644***  0.717**  0.010   0.128 
  (0.201)  (0.274)    (0.245)  (0.332)  (0.160)  (0.213) 
Belief            0.928***  0.933*** 
            (0.021)  (0.026) 
Female   2.343***   1.304     2.284***   0.419   0.109  0.797 
  (0.623)  (0.897)    (0.760)  (1.087)  (0.496)  (0.695) 
Age  0.400***  0.443*    0.571***  0.653**  0.200**  0.240 
  (0.122)  (0.251)    (0.148)  (0.304)  (0.097)  (0.195) 
Age squared   3.887***   4.570     5.887***   7.034**   2.279**   2.770 
  (1.301)  (2.840)    (1.587)  (3.443)  (1.034)  (2.203) 
Controls  No  Yes    No  Yes  No  Yes 
Constant  17.613***  20.666***    15.988***  14.654**   0.360   4.628 
  (2.921)  (5.648)    (3.564)  (6.847)  (2.343)  (4.406) 
F test  9.1  2.7    8.8  2.2  356.1  104.5 
Prob > F  0.000  0.001    0.000  0.010  0.000  0.000 
R2 adjusted  0.027  0.023    0.026  0.016  0.589  0.598 
N  1488  904    1488  904  1488  904 
The  table  shows  OLS  estimates  for  Belief  and  Contribution  in  the  first  experiment.  Dependent  variable  is  Belief  or 
Contribution in the first experiment, censored at 0 and 50. Independent variables are Belief, a dummy for Trust and the 
Fairness score. Further controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of the participants, as is and squared. Controls 
contains variables for education, salary, risk preferences, and the score in the cognitive reflection test. The figures reported 
are coefficients, with corresponding standard errors are given in the parentheses.; * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 
percent, *** at 1 percent. 
Columns (5) and (6) of table 1 show estimates of contribution choices when participants’ 
beliefs  are  included  as  explanatory  variable.  Accounting  for  beliefs  dramatically  affects 
results.  
First, it increases the share of the explained variance from about 2 percent in (3) and (4) to 
around  60  percent  in  (5)  and  (6).  The  coefficient  for  Belief  is  close  to  unity  and  highly 
significant. Thus, beliefs about other participants’ contributions are a very strong predictor for 
contribution choices. This finding underscores the visual impression from figure 1 and lends 
support to the importance of conditional cooperation discussed in more detail in the next 
section.  
Second, and more important for our purpose, is the differential effect of beliefs on the 
coefficients of Trust and Fairness in columns (5) and (6). Fairness now has no explanatory 
power  at  all,  indicating  that  the  expected  fairness  of  other  people  only  indirectly  affects 
behavior in the Standard game. That is, the effect of Fairness on contributions is belief 14 
 
mediated. Accounting for beliefs in the regression has different consequences in the case of 
Trust.  While  the  effect  of  Trust  on  beliefs  was  insignificant  [see  (1)],  the  effect  on 
contributions is strong in (3) and survives the inclusion of the belief variable in (5) and (6). 
Thus,  Trust  does  not  seem  to  capture  beliefs  about  others’  behavior  but  rather  about 
participants’ own behavior. In the Appendix we provide two robustness checks for the results 
reported  in  Table  1.  Table  A2  reports  OLS  models  using  either  Trust  or  Fairness  as 
explanatory  variables.  Table  A3  reports  the  same  models  as  Table  1  but  uses  Tobit 
estimations. 
Third, we note that the age effects identified in (3) and (4) lose their significance once 
Belief is included as an explanatory variable in (5) and (6). The reason is that age is strongly 
related to beliefs as seen in (1) and (2) indicating that people around the age of 45 contribute 
more than others because they are more optimistic about other peoples’ contributions. The 
coefficients for female gender become positive but remain insignificant. Education tends to 
increase contributions but income does not affect contributions in any systematic way. 
 
3.2 Relating Trust and Fairness to behavior in the Strategy game 
Cooperation in the Standard game is driven by preferences and beliefs. Our results from the 
Standard game suggest that the Fairness question captures beliefs while the Trust question 
captures preferences for contributing. Our Strategy game allows us to test this claim in more 
detail.  The  Standard  game  offers  only  limited  information  to  identify  preferences  for 
contributing  because  we  observe only  one  contribution  decision  for  each  participant.  The 
Strategy game, in contrast, is designed to identify contribution strategies rather than single 
actions. We conclude from our analysis of the Strategy game below that the Trust question 
indeed measures preferences while the Fairness question measures beliefs.  
A strong majority of 69 percent of our participants are Conditional cooperators according 
to  the  classification  developed  by  Fischbacher  et  al.  (2001).  As  suggested  by  the  name, 
conditional  cooperators  condition  their  contribution  on  the  other  group  members’ 
contributions.  Their  willingness  to  contribute  to  the  common  project  increases  with  the 
contributions of the other members of the group. More specifically, a participant is classified 
as a conditional cooperator if his contribution is weakly increasing in the average contribution 
of the other group members (with at least one strict increase). A participant is also classified 
as conditional cooperator if the correlation between the participant's contributions and the 15 
 
average contributions of the other group members is significant and positive.
20 Participants 
who contribute Dkr. 0 at all levels (15 percent) are called Free riders.
21 The remaining 16 
percent do not fit into either category. For convenience, we call them Other.
22 
Figure 2 shows average contribution profiles for each preference type. The horizontal axis 
shows  the  average  contribution  of  the  other  group  members  and  the  vertical  axis  the 
conditional contribution.  
Figure 2: Cooperator types 
 
The figure shows average contribution in Dkr. conditional on average contribution by 
other group members, by cooperator type. The diagonal indicates the locus of a perfect 
match between own and others’ average contribution (n = 1488). 
Tables 2 and 3 investigate how Trust and Fairness relates to cooperation preferences in 
two  ways.  First,  we  use  the  cooperator  types  as  defined  above  and  ask  what  determines 
whether a person is classified as Conditional Cooperator, relative to the other two categories. 
Second, we construct a measure of the “strength” of conditional cooperation and ask to what 
                                                 
20   We adapt the classification of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to account for the fact that we observe fewer data 
points per participant. In Fischbacher et al. the subjects indicated their conditional contribution for 21 
contribution levels, while we have only 11 observations per subject. The original criterion of a 1 percent 
significant Spearman rank correlation is thus much more restrictive in our case. We therefore reduced the 
requested significance level to 10 percent. For the vast majority of observations the classification does not 
depend on the specific significance level. If we apply the  1 percent criterion to our data, we classify 67% as 
Conditional cooperators. Interestingly, many conditional cooperators (45.8 percent) perfectly match the 
other group members’ average. 
21   Our classification results are comparable to those found in other studies. Variation in the shares is likely to 
be due to differences by country. For example, the shares for Conditional cooperators and Free riders are in 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) 50% and 30% for Swiss subjects, in Herrmann and Thöni (2009) 56% and 6% for 
Russian subjects, in Kocher et al. (2007) 81% and 8% for US subjects, in Burlando and Guala (2003) 76% 
and 9% for Italian subjects. 
22   Classifications often also include a third type, the Triangle contributors, who, in response to increasing 
contribution levels, increase their contribution up to some maximum and decrease it afterwards. About a 
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extent it can be accounted for by Trust and Fairness. We find that Trust is significant in both 
cases, while Fairness is not. These findings from the Strategy game support our interpretation 
of results from the Standard game that Trust captures cooperation preferences. 
Table 2: Characteristics of Conditional cooperators 
   (1)  (2) 
   Probit for Conditional Cooperator 
Trust  0.076  0.385** 
  (0.123)  (0.171) 
Fairness   0.030   0.026 
  (0.022)  (0.031) 
Female  0.126*  0.056 
  (0.069)  (0.101) 
Age  0.006   0.005 
  (0.014)  (0.029) 
Age squared   0.146  0.036 
  (0.145)  (0.325) 
Controls  No  Yes 
Constant  0.689**  0.715 
  (0.331)  (0.650) 
Model chi square  19.0  18.1 
Prob > chi2  0.002  0.112 
Pseudo R squared  0.010  0.016 
N  1488  904 
 
The table shows probit estimates for being classified as Conditional cooperator. Classification is according to the conditional 
contribution scheme in the Strategy game. Independent variables are a dummy for Trust and the Fairness score. Further 
controls  include  a  gender  dummy  Female,  the  Age  of  the  participants  and  its  square.  Controls  contains  variables  for 
education, salary, risk preferences, and the score in the cognitive reflection test. The numbers reported are coefficients, with 
the corresponding standard errors shown in the parentheses.; * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 
percent. 
 
Table 2 shows how the type Conditional cooperator relates to Trust and Fairness and our 
socio economic variables. The table shows probit estimates for the influence of Trust and 
Fairness  on  the  probability  of  being  a  Conditional  cooperator,  with  and  without  the 
additional controls. In line with the results reported in table 1, we find that Fairness does not 
predict a subject’s type while we have some evidence that Trust is a significant predictor for 
being  classified  as  Conditional  cooperator.
23 The  marginal  effect  of  Trust  is  about  15 
percentage points according to Model (2). 
                                                 
23   This result is robust to estimating the influence of Trust and Fairness separately. If we remove Fairness, 
then the estimates for Trust is β = 0.016, se = 0.115 in Model (1) and β = 0.336, se = 0.036 in Model (2). 
Fairness remains insignificant in both models when we exclude Trust. 17 
 
Table 3 presents results for the second way of investigating how Trust and Fairness relate 
to  cooperation  preferences.  We  construct  a  measure  of  the  “strength”  of  conditional 
cooperation by calculating the average contribution over all 11 conditional contributions per 
subject and we restrict our attention to Conditional cooperators who account for 69 percent of 
our sample. The approach presented in table 3 also serves to address a potential objection to 
the  analysis  in  table  2.  There,  we  compare  the  type  Conditional  cooperator  against  a 
heterogeneous class of Other and Free rider types. This reference category contains a large 
variety  of  patterns,  some  including  very  high  contributions.  This  heterogeneity  in  the 
reference category potentially blurs the results but we find that results are robust across the 
two approaches in tables 2 and 3. 
Table 3: Relation of Trust and Fairness to strength of conditional cooperation 
 
  
Dep. var.: Av. conditional 
contribution 
   (1)  (2) 
Trust  2.660***  3.580*** 
  (0.788)  (1.186) 
Fairness   0.093   0.106 
  (0.142)  (0.197) 
Female   0.598   0.536 
  (0.425)  (0.617) 
Age  0.121  0.059 
  (0.084)  (0.166) 
Age squared   1.168   0.818 
  (0.912)  (1.882) 
Controls  No  Yes 
Constant  19.974***  22.499*** 
  (1.960)  (3.697) 
F test  3.7  1.6 
Prob > F  0.003  0.076 
R2  0.018  0.031 
N  1029  636 
Table 3 shows OLS regressions. Dependent variable is average conditional contribution. Only data from 
subjects  classified  as  Conditional  cooperator.  Independent  variables  are  a  dummy  for  Trust  and  the 
Fairness score. Further controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of the participants, as is and 
squared. Controls contains variables for education, salary, risk preferences, and the score in the cognitive 
reflection test. The numbers reported are coefficients, with corresponding standard errors in parentheses.; 
* denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent. 
Table  3  shows  the  results  of  OLS  regressions  explaining  the  average  conditional 
contribution. In support of our conjecture that Trust proxies preferences we find a highly 
significant positive influence of Trust on average conditional contribution in the Strategy 
game in both specifications of table 3. In column (4) of table 1, we found that those who trust 
contribute, given their beliefs, on average between Dkr. 2.1 and 3.3 more than those who do 18 
 
not. This finding is in line with the results in table 3 which show that Conditional cooperators 
who trust have average conditional cooperation schedules which are between Dkr. 2.7 and 3.6 
higher than those who do not trust. 
None of the other explanatory variables in table 3 are significant, meaning that Trust is the 
only  variable  among  those  considered  here  that  explains  the  strength  of  conditional 
cooperation. In line with our conclusions from analyzing the Standard game, we find that 
Fairness has no systematic influence on average conditional contribution. 
 
4.  Summary and conclusions 
We use data from an experiment with close to 1500 participants from all walks of life in 
Denmark to show that the most prominent survey measure of trust (Trust) is an important 
predictor  of  social  capital  in  the  guise  of  voluntary  contributions  to  public  goods.  We 
contribute  to  the  microfoundations  of  social  capital  by  showing  that  Trust  proxies  the 
preference driven  component  of  cooperation.  Trust  is  a  stronger  predictor  of  cooperation 
preferences than gender, age, education or income. In contrast, we find that an alternative 
survey  measure  of  social  capital  that  has  recently  been  introduced  to  the  World  Values 
Survey,  the  Fairness  question,  primarily  explains  optimistic  beliefs  about  cooperation  in 
others.  These  optimistic  beliefs  map  into  increased  cooperation  because most  participants 
have  preferences  to  cooperate  given  that  others  do,  i.e.  because  they  are  conditional 
cooperators. Apart from this belief mediated effect, we find no direct influence of Fairness on 
cooperation.  
The effects of Trust and Fairness on cooperation are statistically significant in regressions 
which  control  for  socio economic  variables  like  age,  gender,  income  and  education.  The 
effects we find are not only statistically significant, they are also economically relevant. For 
example, those who trust contribute 10 percent more than those who do not, and those who 
indicate full confidence in other people’s fairness contribute 20 percent more than those who 
express minimal confidence in other’s fairness. These effects are remarkably strong, both 
compared to findings in the literature and compared to alternative explanations. First, research 
in social psychology suggests that the relation between attitudes and behavior is often rather 
weak (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken 2003), and previous studies on the relation between survey and 
experimental measures of social capital find mixed effects (see introduction for a discussion 
and for references). Second, in line with much of the literature, we find that cooperation 19 
 
behavior is mainly driven by beliefs. However, if beliefs are not accounted for in regressions, 
Trust and Fairness variables account for more variation than our socio economic variables.
24  
We show that Trust and Fairness are systematically related to cooperation in a one shot 
interaction with fully anonymous counterparts, i.e. in a situation without prior information 
about  or  experience  with  their  counterparts.  Thus,  Trust  and  Fairness  capture  important 
aspects of “thin” trust towards a “generalized other” which has been found to be a relevant 
determinant  of  economic  prosperity  (Putnam  2001).  Beliefs  are  likely  to  be  particularly 
relevant in such anonymous one shot interactions. After all, optimism and pessimism about 
others’ inclination to cooperate matters most when little is known about actual cooperation. 
However,  in  everyday  life,  cooperation  problems  often  loom  in  groups  whose  members 
repeatedly interact, as in the workplace or repeat customer relations. Based on our results, we 
speculate that “thick” trust which is required in this type of repeated interaction is better 
predicted by Trust than by Fairness. The reason is that beliefs about cooperation are adjusted 
to observed contributions over time and, therefore, eventually become largely irrelevant as an 
independent determinant of behavior.
25  
The  policy  relevance  of  the  distinction  of  belief driven  and  preference driven  social 
capital comes from the relative stability and malleability of the two. Economists generally 
believe that overly optimistic or pessimistic beliefs are easier to shape than deep preferences 
and policy is therefore more likely to be effective if targeting to correct overly pessimistic 
beliefs.
26 
 We now provide a simple test for our finding that Fairness captures beliefs and Trust 
captures preferences by exploiting the cross country dimension of the World Values Survey 
data.
27 It should be noted that our analysis below is rather preliminary and suggestive due to 
the limited number of countries for which data is available over time for both measures. The 
main reason is that the Fairness question has only been introduced in the two most recent 
waves (wave 4 and 5) and, in addition, the answer format of Fairness has changed from 
                                                 
24   The finding that the socio economic variables taken together can account only for only little of the total 
variance is in line with, e.g. Gächter et al. (2004) and Bellemare and Kröger (2007). 
25    This conjecture could be tested experimentally in a public goods game which is repeatedly played among 
the same group members. Our results suggest that Fairness has more predictive power for contributions in 
the first round than in later rounds while Trust should have a lasting impact in repeated games. 
26   This idea stands behind the “broken windows” theory which claims that (petty) crime is more common if 
signs of norm violation are highly salient. See Keizer, Lindenberg and Steg (2008) for a field experiment 
showing “cross norm inhibition”, i.e. that violation of one norm can induce the violation of another norm.  
27   Data from Waves 4 and 5 comes from the following sources. For Wave 4 data: European and World Values 
Surveys (WVS) four wave integrated data file, 1981 2004, v.20060423, 2006. Wave 5 data: WVS 2005 
official data file v.20081015, 2008. WVS Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 20 
 
binary in wave 4 to a ten point scale in wave 5. Information about Trust and Fairness is 
available for only 20 countries in both waves. 
  
Figure 3: Stability of Trust and Fairness over time 
 
The figure shows the relative stability of Trust and Fairness from wave 4 to wave 5 in the World Values survey 
for a sample of 33 (left panel) and 20 countries (right panel). Hollow symbols in the left panel stem for countries 
which are not present in the right panel due to missing data. 
Figure 3 shows how Trust (left panel) and Fairness (right panel) relate across wave 4 
(1999 2004) and wave 5 (2005 2008). Solid symbols represent the 20 countries which are 
present in both panels. The scatter plots indeed suggest that Fairness scores are more volatile 
than Trust scores. To provide a simple test, we calculate Spearman rank correlations which 
are invariant to different scaling of the two variables. We find that the correlation across 
waves is stronger for Trust (ρ = 0.705, p = 0.000) than for Fairness (ρ = 0.467, p = 0.038), 





















































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fairness, wave 421 
 
References 
Ahn, T.K., Ostrom, E., Schmidt, D. and Walker, J. (2003): Trust in Two Person Games: 
Game Structures and Linkages. In: E. Ostrom, J. Walker (eds.): Trust and Reciprocity. 
Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research. Russell Sage: New York: 323 51. 
Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2002): Who Trusts Others? Journal of Public Economics 
85(2): 207 34. 
Andreoni,  J.  (1988):  Why  Free  Ride?  Strategies  and  Learning  in  Public  Goods  Experiments. 
Journal of Public Economics 37(3): 291 304.  
Andreoni,  J.  and  Vesterlund,  L.  (2001):  Which  is  the  Fair  Sex?  Gender  Differences  in 
Altruism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 293 312. 
Bellemare, C. and Kröger, S. (2007): On Representative Social Capital. European Economic 
Review 51: 183 202. 
Beugelsdijk,  S.  (2006):  A  Note  on  the  Theory  and  Measurement  of  Trust  in  Explaining 
Differences in Economic Growth. Cambridge Journal of Economics 30: 371 87. 
Bohnet, I., Greig, F., Herrmann, B. and Zeckhauser, R. (2008): Betrayal Aversion. American 
Economic Review 98(1): 294 310. 
Burlando, R.M. and Guala, F. (2003): Conditional Cooperation: New Evidence from a Public 
Goods Experiment. CEEL working paper, University of Trento.   
Cox, J. (2004): How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 46: 
260 81. 
Croson, R. and Gneezy, U. (2009): Gender Differences in Preferences. Journal of Economic 
Literature 47(2): 448 74. 
Dasgupta, P. and Serageldin, I. (1999, eds.): Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. Sage: 
Washington D.C. 
Durlauf, S. (2002): On the Empirics of Social Capital. Economic Journal 112(483): 459 79. 
Eagly, A. and Chaiken, S. (1993): The Psychology of Attitudes. Wadsworth: Belmont, CA. 
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., Rosenbladt, B.V., Schupp, J. and Wagner, G. (2003): A Nation 
wide  Laboratory  Examining  Trust  and  Trustworthiness  by  Integrating  Behavioral 
Experiments into Representative Surveys. Working Paper 141, University Zurich. 
Fehr, E. (2009): On the Economics and Biology of Trust. Journal of the European Economic 
Association 7: 235 66. 
Fischbacher, U. and Gächter, S. (2010): Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free 
Riding in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review 100: 541 56. 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. and Fehr, E. (2001): Are People Conditionally Cooperative? 
Evidence from Public Goods Experiment. Economics Letters 71: 397 404. 
Frederick,  S.  (2005):  Cognitive  Reflection  and  Decision  Making.  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives 19: 25 42.  
Gächter, S., Hermann, B. and Thöni, C. (2004): Trust, Voluntary Cooperation, and Socio 
Economic  Background:  Survey  and  Experimental  Evidence.  Journal  of  Economic 
Behavior and Organization 55: 505 31. 
Glaeser, E., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J. and Soutter, C. (2000): Measuring Trust. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 115: 811 46. 22 
 
Guiso,  L.,  Sapienza,  P.  and  Zingales,  L.  (2004):  The  Role  of  Social  Capital  in  Financial 
Development. American Economic Review 94(3): 526 56. 
Guiso,  L.,  Sapienza,  P.  and  Zingales,  L.  (2009):  Cultural  Biases  in  Economic  Exchange? 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124: 1095 1131. 
Harrison, G.W. and List, J.A. (2004): Field Experiments. Journal of Economic Literature 
42(4): 1009 55.  
Herrmann,  B.  and  Thöni,  C.  (2009):  Measuring  Conditional  Cooperation:  A  Replication 
Study in Russia. Experimental Economics 12: 87 92. 
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C. and Gächter, S. (2008): Antisocial Punishment Across Societies. 
Science 319: 1362 7.  
Holm,  H.J.,  and  Danielson,  A.  (2005):  Tropic  Trust  versus  Nordic  Trust:  Experimental 
Evidence from Tanzania and Sweden. Economic Journal 115(503): 505 32.  
Karlan, D. (2005): Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict 
Financial Decisions. American Economic Review 95: 1688 99. 
Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S. and Steg, L. (2008): The Spreading of Disorder. Science 332:1681 
5. 
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997): Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoff? A Cross 
country Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1251 88. 
Kocher,  M.G.,  Cherry,  T.,  Kroll,  S.,  Netzer,  R.J.  and  Sutter,  M.  (2008):  Conditional 
Cooperation on Three Continents. Economics Letters 101(3): 175 8. 
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997): Trust in Large 
Organizations. American Economic Review 87: 333 8. 
Miller, A.S. and Mitamura, T. (2003): Are Surveys on Trust Trustworthy? Social Psychology 
Quarterly 66: 62 70. 
Naef,  M.  and  Schunk,  D.  (2010) :  Once  bitten,  twice  shy:  On  the  causal  effect  of  prior 
experiences on trusting behaviour, working paper.  
Nowell, C. and Tinkler, S. (1994): The Influence of Gender on the Provision of a Public 
Good. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25: 25 36. 
Putnam, R.D. (2001): Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of the American Community. 
New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. 
Sapienza, P., Toldra, A. and Zingales, L. (2007): Understanding Trust. NBERWorking Paper 
no. 13387. 
Sobel, J. (2002): Can we Trust Social Capital? Journal of Economic Literature 40: 139 54. 
Solow,  J.L.  and  Kirkwood,  N.  (2002):  Group  Identity  and  Gender  in  Public  Goods 
Experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 48: 403 12. 
Tanaka,  T.  Camerer,  C.  and  Nguyen,  Q.  (2010):  Risk  and  Time  Preferences:  Linking 
Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam. American Economic Review, 
100: 557 571 
Yamagishi, T. (1986): The Provision of a Sanctioning system as a Public Good. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 51: 110 16. 
Zak, P.J. and Knack, S. (2001): Trust and Growth. Economic Journal 111: 295 321. 




Table A1: Representativeness of sample 
 
  Experiment 
Danish 
population* 
  N  Fraction  Fraction 
Gender       
Female  719  48.3%  50.2% 
Male  769  51.7%  49.8% 
       
Age       
18 30 years  224  15.0%  18.5% 
30 44 years  443  29.8%  29.1% 
45 59 years  537  36.1%  27.0% 
60 80 years  284  19.1%  25.3% 
       
Education (highest completed)       
Basic education (up to 10 years)  156  10.5%  26.3% 
High school or vocational education (Education 1)  376  25.3%  45.4% 
Medium tertiary education (Education 2)  710  47.7%  21.1% 
Long tertiary education (Education 3)  246  16.5%  7.1% 
       
Income       
Low Income (< Dkr. 300.000 per year)  357  34.1%  65.9% 
Middle Income (Dkr. 300.000 400.000 per year)  320  30.6%  19.1% 
High Income (> Dkr. 400.000 per year)  369  35.3%  15.0% 
       
* For gender and age, the data in the column Danish population summarizes individuals between 18 80 years of 
age. For education the population is restricted to individuals between 20 69.  24 
 
Table A2: Determinants of beliefs and contributions 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)     (5)  (6) 
  Dependent variable 
   Belief     Contribution 
Trust  2.158**    0.174      4.133***   
  (1.034)    (1.491)      (1.260)   
Fairness    0.733***    0.811***      0.835*** 
    (0.186)    (0.258)      (0.227) 
Belief               
               
Female   2.128***   2.373***   1.018   1.247     2.081***   2.399*** 
  (0.622)  (0.621)  (0.898)  (0.895)    (0.758)  (0.759) 
Age  0.439***  0.400***  0.534**  0.444*    0.608***  0.572*** 
  (0.121)  (0.122)  (0.251)  (0.251)    (0.148)  (0.149) 
Age squared   4.215***   3.891***   5.492*   4.574     6.196***   5.903*** 
  (1.302)  (1.300)  (2.842)  (2.840)    (1.586)  (1.589) 
Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes    No  No 
Constant  20.464***  17.889***  23.606***  20.019***    18.677***  17.056*** 
  (2.808)  (2.889)  (5.608)  (5.612)    (3.421)  (3.530) 
F test  8.4  11.3  2.0  2.9    9.2  9.9 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.028  0.001    0.000  0.000 
R2 adjusted  0.020  0.027  0.012  0.023    0.022  0.023 
N  1488  1488  904  904    1488  1488 
 
   (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   Dependent variable: Contribution 
Trust  3.245*    2.130***    3.083***   
  (1.801)    (0.818)    (1.148)   
Fairness    0.826***    0.154    0.071 
    (0.312)    (0.148)    (0.201) 
Belief      0.928***  0.929***  0.931***  0.931*** 
      (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Female   0.193   0.485   0.106   0.195  0.755  0.676 
  (1.084)  (1.085)  (0.493)  (0.495)  (0.692)  (0.696) 
Age  0.725**  0.652**  0.200**  0.200**  0.228  0.239 
  (0.303)  (0.304)  (0.096)  (0.097)  (0.194)  (0.195) 
Age squared   7.764**   7.029**   2.284**   2.289**   2.649   2.772 
  (3.433)  (3.443)  (1.031)  (1.036)  (2.193)  (2.211) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Constant  16.982**  15.403**   0.320  0.437   5.002   3.227 
  (6.775)  (6.802)  (2.256)  (2.323)  (4.360)  (4.392) 
F test  2.0  2.3  427.6  424.8  113.3  111.8 
Prob > F  0.027  0.008  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R2 adjusted  0.012  0.016  0.589  0.588  0.599  0.596 
N  904  904  1488  1488  904  904 
The  table  shows  OLS  estimates  for  Belief  and  Contribution  in  the  first  experiment.  Dependent  variable  is  Belief  or 
Contribution in the first experiment, censored at 0 and 50. Independent variables are Belief, a dummy for Trust and the 
Fairness score. Further controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of the participants, as is and squared. Controls 
contains variables for education, salary, risk preferences, and the score in the cognitive reflection test. The numbers reported 
are coefficients, with corresponding standard errors are given in the parentheses.; * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 
percent, *** at 1 percent. 25 
 
Table A3: Determinants of beliefs and contributions: Tobit estimates. 
 
   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Dependent variable 
   Belief     Contribution 
Trust  0.476   2.519    3.860*  2.039  2.123  4.028** 
  (1.349)  (1.959)    (2.225)  (3.309)  (1.363)  (1.980) 
Fairness  0.821***  1.129***    1.063***  1.260**  0.112  0.006 
  (0.244)  (0.338)    (0.407)  (0.581)  (0.252)  (0.347) 
Belief            1.491***  1.539*** 
            (0.041)  (0.054) 
Female   2.966***   1.849*     4.265***   1.434   0.672  0.523 
  (0.756)  (1.108)    (1.267)  (1.897)  (0.784)  (1.134) 
Age  0.473***  0.560*    0.870***  1.095**  0.286*  0.436 
  (0.147)  (0.309)    (0.246)  (0.526)  (0.151)  (0.312) 
Age squared   4.497***   5.728     8.910***   11.757**   3.168*   4.883 
  (1.579)  (3.504)    (2.638)  (5.962)  (1.628)  (3.537) 
Controls  No  Yes    No  Yes  No  Yes 
Constant  16.356***  19.552***    11.264*  8.983   15.555***   25.129*** 
  (3.531)  (6.966)    (5.879)  (11.815)  (3.682)  (7.138) 
Sigma  14.120  14.431    22.657  23.593  13.276  13.374 
Log likelihood   5244   3137    4522   2639   3862   2232 
Chi2  45.6  33.2    41.4  24.1  1361.0  838.2 
Prob > F  0.000  0.001    0.000  0.020  0.000  0.000 
N  1488  904    1488  904  1488  904 
The table shows Tobit estimates for Belief and Contribution in the first experiment. Dependent variable is Belief (Model 1 
and 2) or Contribution (remaining Models) in the first experiment, censored at 0 and 50. Independent variables are Belief, a 
dummy for Trust and the Fairness score. Further controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of the participants, as is 
and squared. Controls contains variables for education, salary, risk preferences, and the score in the cognitive reflection test. 
The figures reported are coefficients, with corresponding standard errors are given in the parentheses.; * denotes significance 




Figure A1: Screenshot of graphical illustration of incentives in the Public goods game   
 
(Translation: 1: each participant is endowed with Dkr. 50, 2: All simultaneously choose a 
contribution between Dkr. 0 and 50, 3: all contributions are doubled and 4: equally shared 
among participants, 5: Each participant gets his share, 6: final earnings) 27 
 
Figure A2: Screenshot of profit calculator  
(participants could explore payoffs for each participant by typing various contributions)  
 
 